Whatever triggered this concern (e.g., the gap between his possible recollection of Ben-Gurion’s 1961 statement about a “pilot” reprocessing plant and CIA’s apparent lack of knowledge about reprocessing), NSAM 231 directed the three relevant agency chiefs – State, AEC, CIA – “to undertake every feasible measure to improve our intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program as well as other Israeli or Arab advanced weapons programs” (a reference to chemical, biological, or radiological weapons and missile programs). It is evident from NSAM 231 that Kennedy thought official knowledge of the Israeli nuclear program was lacking. Then, according to McCone, Kennedy instructed Bundy to ask Secretary Rusk, in collaboration with the DCI and AEC chairman, to submit a proposal “as to how some form of international or bilateral US safeguards could be instituted to protect against the contingency mentioned.” According to McCone’s record of the meeting, he raised the “question of Israel acquiring nuclear capability” and gave Kennedy Sherman Kent’s estimate of the consequences of Israeli nuclearization. FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight ReportsĪ day before National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy issued this National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), President Kennedy met CIA Director McCone.

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